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NOTES
THE ROLE OF THE COURT IN PROTECTING
THE ENVIRONMENT A JURISPRUDENTIAL ANALYSIS*
I.

INTRODUCTION'

Today man's environment faces many grave problems,' and
in increasing numbers concerned citizens are turning to the
courts seeking judicial protection for the environment. 2 The
purpose of this paper is to consider the proper role that a court,
as an institution, should play in protecting the environment.
When a court is asked to solve environmental problems directly3 on a case by case basis, certain questions arise: Is the
court institutionally suited to solve the problem at hand? If
not, does the court have the constitutional power to consider
the problem?
II.

Tnm hwSTrrU

oNAL Lrms OF ADjuDIcATmo

A. In GeneraZ
4
When one speaks of the institutional limits of adjudication,
he has in mind certain problems that are incapable of resolu* This paper was written as part of a water law seminar at the School of
Law of the University of South Carolina. The seminar was made possible
through funds supplied by the Office of Water Resources Research of the
Department of the Interior, under a matching grant agreement with the
Water Research Institute of Clemson University.

1. See TiuE, Feb. 2, 1970, at 56-63; TRALk, Aug./Sept., 1969, at 10-28.
2. See Main, Conservationist at the Barricades, FORTUNE, Feb., 1970, at
145; Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine In Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MIcH. L. REv. 471, 473-74 (1970).
3. In environmental cases a court's participation might be characterized
as either direct or indirect depending upon which governmental institution is
ultimately responsible for solving the problem presented on its merits. A
court's participation is direct when it attempts to fashion a solution to the
problem on a case by case basis without the aid of a statute. A court's participation is indirect when it applies to the facts of a given case a legislative
solution to the problem or when it reviews an administrative agency's attempt
to solve the problem without becoming involved in the merits.
In some cases a court's participation in environmental problems will be
direct although the court appears to be applying a legislative solution. For
example, a court may be called upon to directly solve environmental problems
by a mere procedural statute that does not prescribe a substantive rule of
decision.
4. Professor Lon L. Fuller of the Harvard Law School has defined adjudication as a form of social ordering that is distinguished from the other
forms of social ordering, ordering by reciprocity and ordering by common
aims, by the way in which the effected parties participate. Ordering by
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tion by adjudication. Adjudication is, in other words, by nature
not suited to perform certain tasks. The question of concern
here is whether any of the environmental problems presently to
be considered fall beyond the natural limits of adjudication.
B. Adjudication Re=sZts in a Foz'mal Deolaration of Right and
W rong.
Traditionally courts have been viewed as an institutional
mechanism for settling actual disputes between litigants.5 In
settling disputes, courts determine the rights or, in criminal
cases, the wrongs of the parties before them.0 This observation
-that the end result of adjudication is the formal declaration
of rights and wrongs-suggests an institutional limitation of
adjudication that Professor Lon L. Fuller of the Harvard Law
School feels is the most significant of all.7 In the words of
Professor Fuller:
Adjudication is not a proper form of social ordering in
those areas where the effectiveness of human association would be destroyed if it were organized about
formally defined "rights" and "wrongs". Courts have,
reciprocity generally involves an exchange, or something close to it, between
two or more parties seeking different ends (e.g., a contract, a treaty, etc.).
The parties participation here could best be described by the term negotiation.
Ordering by common aims generally involves an association, voluntary or involuntary, between two or more parties desiring the same end (e.g., a political
party, democratic government, etc.). The parties' participation here could
best be described by the term voting or some such similar term. With adjudication the parties participate in the decision of a court, administrative
body, or arbiter by presenting proofs and reasoned arguments. This mode of
participation defines the institutional limits of adjudication. If an attempt to
solve a problem by adjudication would destroy the efficacy of the parties'
participation by presenting proofs and reasoned arguments, then that problem
is beyond the limits of adjudication. L. Fuller, The Forms And Limits Of
Adjudication, at 4-17, 36 (unpublished article; copies available in the library
of the University of South Carolina School of Law) [hereinafter cited as
The Forms And Limits Of Adjudication].

5. J.

GRAY, THE NATURE AND

SOURCES OF LAW

115 (1938); Trelease,

Law Water and People: The Role of Water Law In Conserving and De-veloping Natural Resources In The West, 18 Wyo. L.J. 3, 3 (1962).
6. J. GRAY, supra note 5, at 114-15; see The Forms And Limits Of Adjudication 14-17.
Professor Fuller feels that the statement: "judges declare rights", is not a
significant way of describing the limits of adjudication. Rather he feels that
this statement follows from his definition of adjudication, which, he feels, is a
more significant way of describing the limits of adjudication. See discussion
note 4 supra. Since the litigants participate in the judge's decision by presenting proofs and reasoned arguments, they will necessarily be expected to point
to some principle or standard that would support a decision in their favor.
And since a claim of right is a claim based upon "some principle or standard
by which [the] 'right' can be tested," it follows that courts generally decide
claims of right. Id. at 14.
7. The Forms And Limits Of Adjudication, at 17.
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for example, rather regularly refused to enforce agreements between husband and wife affecting the internal
organization of family life. There are other and wider
areas where the intrusion of "the machinery of the
law" is equally inappropriate. An adjudicative board
might well undertake to allocate one thousand tons of
coal among three claimants: it could hardly conduct
even the simplest coal-mining enterprise by the forms
of adjudication. Wherever successful human association depends upon spontaneous and informal collaboration, shifting its forms with the task at hand, there
adjudication is out of place except as it may declare
certain ground rules applicable to a wide variety of

activities."
In connection with this first observed limitation, it might
be useful to consider briefly the doctrine of common law nuisance, 9 which courts have developed and used as a tool for
controlling environmental pollution.
Like the law of negligence, the law of nuisance governs the
relationships between individuals living together in organized
society. 10 Generally speaking, these relationships are of such
a nature that they are not susceptible to "a pervasive delimita8. Id.
9. See gencrally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 592-633
(3d ed. 1964). Generally speaking, there are two types of nuisance: public
nuisance and private nuisance. The analytical distinction between the two is
that private nuisance involves an unreasonable and substantial interference

with the plaintiff's rights to the use or enjoyment of his land, whereas a
public nuisance involves an unreasonable and substantial interference with
common public rights. Id. at 593-94. In order to recover damages or receive
injunctive relief in a suit based upon public nuisance, a plantiff must be able
to show some special injury "over and above the ordinary damage caused to
the public at large by the nuisance." Id. at 608.
10. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 822, Comment j at 231 (1939).
Life in organized society, and especially in populous communities,
involves an unavoidable clash of individaul interests. Practically
all human activities, unless carried on in a wilderness, interfere
to some extent with others or involve some risk of interference,
and these interferences range from mere trifling annoyances to
serious harms. It is an obvious truth that each individual in a
community must put up with a certain amount of annoyance,
inconvenience and interference, and must take a certain amount of
risk in order that all may get on together. The very existence
of organized society depends upon the principle of 'give and take,
live and let live,' and therefore the law of torts does not attempt
to impose liability or shift the loss in every case where one person's conduct has some detrimental effect on another. Liability is
imposed only in those cases where the harm or risk to one is
greater than he ought to be required to bear under the circumstances, at least without compensation.
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tion of rights and wrongs."'" A fortiori,"adjudication is out of
place [here] except as it may declare certain ground rules applicable to a wide variety of activities."' 2
With respect to conduct constituting pollution of the environment (e.g., industrial, municipal, and individual waste disposal), the law of nuisance lays down certain minimum rules
that must be observed if community living is to continue. 13 It
is not feasible, however, to go beyond declaring a few basic
ground rules. For, although these minimum rules must be observed, individuals and groups in society necessarily have to
dispose of certain waste products generated during the course of
daily living and it is not feasible nor desirable to govern this
activity with a detailed set of rules.
In his book, The Morality of Law,14 Professor Fuller dis-

cusses two concepts of morality that are helpful in understanding the proper role that a court should play in pollution
control.'5 One morality, the morality of duty, "lays down the
basic rules without which an ordered society is impossible, or
-without which an ordered society directed toward certain spell. The Forms And Limits Of Adjudication at 17.

12. Id.
13. The term nuisance is incapable of an exact or comprehensive definition.
W. PRossER, supra note 9, at 592. The general statement of the doctrine-a
substantial and unreasonable interference with a protected interest-constitutes
more of a standard than a rule.
The requirement of unreasonableness, with respect to the defendant's conduct (see generally id. at 602-03, 616-23) has been a source of confusion in
some states that follow the riparian rights doctrine of water law. See generally F. TREELAsE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON WAm LAW 1 (1967);
Trelease, Law, Water and People: The Role of Water Law in Conserving
and Developing Natural Resources in The West, 18 Wyo. L.J. 3, 4 (1962) ;
Note, The Riparian Rights Doctrine In South Carolina, 21 S.C.L. Ray. 757
(1969). Generally speaking, the riparian rights doctrine gives to each riparian
owner an equal right to make a reasonable use of the water which flows
through or by his land. But see Prather v. Hoberg, 24 Cal. 2d 549, 150 P2d
405 (1944) (preference for natural uses). The reasonableness of one riparian's
use is measured against the use of the water by other riparians. Industrial
waste disposal is generally recognized as one use of riparian waters, Note,
The Riparian Right Doctrine In South Carolina, 21 S.C.L. Rv. 757, 765
(1969), and some courts have discussed water pollution in terms of the reasonable use concept of the riparian rights doctrine. See, e.g., Sandusky Portland Cement Co. v. Dixie Pure Ice Co., 221 F. 200 (7th Cir. 1915). This
position creates theoretical problems, however, since riparians have a right to
the reasonable use of riparian waters. Thus, seemingly under this position,
riparians would have a right to pollute and only a riparian could complain of
stream pollution. F. TRELEASE supra, at 243-44. For these reasons courts
more commonly treat water pollution as a problem of nuisance separate and
distinct from the general body of water law. Id. at 244.
14. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (2d ed. 1969).
15. See generally id. at 3-32. For a comprehensive discussion distinguishing
moral rules from other social rules, see H. HART, THE CoNcEPt OF LAw 16976 (1961).
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cific goals must fail of its mark."1 6 The other morality, the
morality of aspiration, is concerned with the highest goals of
human achievement. It "has to do with our efforts to make the
best use of our short lives."'17 Each member of the community
has his own idea of what constitutes excellence in terms of
human achievement and he will allocate his time and efforts
accordingly. In this sense the morality of aspiration has a close
affinity with "[m]arginal utility economics [which] deals with
our efforts to make the best of our limited economics resources."' 8 The morality of duty, on the other hand, "finds
its closest cousin in the law." I9 In terms of a moral scale, the
morality of duty "begins at the bottom with the most obvious
demands of social living .... .20 The morality of aspiration
begins where the morality of duty leaves off "and extends upward to the highest reaches of human aspiration." 21
Generally speaking, the decisions that courts make on a case
by case basis cluster around the bottom of the moral scale-the
morality of duty 2 2-whereas legislative decisions cluster around
the top of the moral scale-the morality of aspiration.2 3 In
other words, courts are primarily concerned with assessing
penalties "for failing to respect the basic requirements of social
living";24 they are concerned with questions of right and wrong
and duty and obligation. The legislature, on the other hand,
is responsible for deciding how the community should allocate
its scarce resources. It is not so much concerned with questions
of right and wrong but rather with making decisions where
there are any number of choices, no one of which can be clearly
said to be right or wrong. For example, a decision to spend so
much tax money to send a man to the moon is not a question of
right or wrong. It is a decision to pursue certain ends ahead of
others with a view toward resources that are limited in their
capacity to achieve all of the ends under consideration. 25
As previously mentioned, certain minimum standards, with
respect to pollution and waste disposal, must be observed or
social living will be impossible. Where these minimum stand16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

L. Fuunm, mspra note 14, at 5-6.
Id. at 17.
Id.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 9-10.
See id. at 31.
See id. at 15-19.
Id. at 6.
Note 23 supra.
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ards are breached, a court has no trouble in assessing an appropriate penalty. Thus, where the smoke from a paper mill
destroys the plaintiff's property, a court is on safe ground when
it either enjoins the nuisance or awards damages or both. A
court could not act with such confidence, however, if it were
asked to decide whether a particular undeveloped tract of land
should be devoted to conservation or industrial development.
This type of question is not a question of right or wrong or
duty or obligation. It is rather the type of question that is
usually decided by a legislature.
C. Adjudication and the Rule of Decision
Another limitation of adjudication as a form of social ordering is related to the first limitation discussed above. It concerns the rational quality that is demanded of an adjudicatory
decision. Since the end product of adjudication is a formal
definition of right or wrong, the judge is expected to assert
"some principle' or standard by which [the right or wrong
defined in his decision] can be tested.

'20

This principle or

standard, commonly referred to as the rule of decision, is generally imposed on the judge by some authority (e.g., a statute)
before the proceedings are initiated.2 7 It is possible in some
cases, however, to proceed with adjudication even though no
rule of decision is formally announced in advance. 28 In such
cases the facts usually suggest a principle to serve as a rule of
decision. For example, the court may be able to fashion a
rule of decision from what it feels is a strong sense of community or what it feels are certain received "ideals of the end of
the legal order ...

and judicial process.

' 29

But where the facts

26. The Forms And Limits Of Adjudication at 14.
27. Professor Fuller points out that the rule of decision may be voluntarily
accepted by the parties before adjudication proceedings are begun, as is the
case with arbitration. Id. at 22.
28. Professor Fuller states:

Where adjudication appears to operate meaningfully without the
support of rules formally declared or accepted in advance, it does
so because it draws its intellectual sustenance from the two basic
forms of social ordering . . .[reciprocity and common aims].
Id. Thus when a court formulates a rule of decision based upon a strong
sense of community, it is relying on the common aims form of social ordering.
When the court formulates a rule of decision based upon "the full implications
of a [regime of reciprocity] already established" (e.g., a customary system of
exchange existing between comm-rcial traders, the system of federalism in
the United States) it is relying on the reciprocal form of social ordering. Id.
at 22-23.
The forms of social ordering are discussed in note 4 supra.
29. Pound, A Comparison Of Ideals Of Law, 47 HARV. L. Ray. 1, 2 (1933).
Dean Pound's discussion of the received ideals of the end of the legal order
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do not readily suggest a rule of decision, then the court will not
be able to proceed confidently without the aid of a previously
announced rule of decision.
Several recent controversies between conservationists and
other groups over the particular use to which an area of land
should be dedicated demonstrate how a court can be drawn in
to a problem that does not readily suggest a rule of decision to
be applied. 30 Typically these cases involve a situation where concerned conservationists seek an injunction against the construction of an industrial complex, highway, bridge, or some other
governmental facility, which they feel will destroy the environment of a particular area. Consider, for example, a case where
the construction of an industrial plant is questioned. There is
authority in nuisance law for judicial intervention to protect the
environmental character of a particular area that is already
developing along certain lines.31 Thus, where an industrial firm
starts construction of a new plant in a locality that is developing primarly along residential lines, generally speaking, it can
be enjoined. But what if the area is previously undeveloped
but prized by conservationists for its natural beauty, which they
feel will be destroyed if the firm is allowed to proceed with its
construction plans. The community may be, and usually is,
equally divided on the issue: some members of the community
feel that the natural quality of the environment should be preserved, whereas others desire industrial development with all
its accompanying economic benefits. Thus, with no clear sense
of community either way, the court would not be able to look to
the common aims of the community in fashioning a rule of
decision.
and judicial process suggests that these received ideals should be characterized
as a form of ordering by common aims. The term public policy is sometimes
used by judges to refer to these received ideals. The term public policy is
also used to refer to certain other values that a particular judge feels are
commonly shared.
30. See, e.g., Robbins v. Department of Public Works, 244 N.E.2d 577
(Mass. 1969) ; Main, Conservationists at the Barricades,FORTUNE, Feb., 1970,
at 150; Ways, How To Think About The Envirowiment, FORTUNE, Feb., 1970.
at 165; TimE, Jan., 26, 1970, at 55, 58.
31. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, at 620-21.
The decisive consideration in many cases is the nature of the
locality, and the suitability of the use made of the land by both
[parties] . . . . The courts have been compelled to recognize that
certain areas, by reason of their physical character or the accident
of community growth, are devoted to certain types of activities,
and that some uses of land are more or less segregated in certain
localities, in order to avoid unnecessary conflict between those
which are necessarily incompatible.
Id. at 620 (footnotes omitted).
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D. The Polycentriv Problem
A third limitation of adjudication as a form of social ordering is one suggested by Professor Fuller that is characterized
by the term, polycentric problem. 2 A polycentric problem is
one that, as the name implies, has many different sides or interacting centers of influence. When a change is made in any one
of these centers, a chain reaction is set off that will eventually
require readjustments to be made at other centers, which will in
turn necessitate further changes. Professor Fuller describes the
complications involved with polycentric problems as follows:
We may visualize this kind of situation by thinking of
a spider web. A pull on one strand will distribute tensions after a complicated pattern throughout the web
as a whole. Doubling the original pull will, in all likelihood, not simply double each of the resulting tensions,
but will rather create a different complicated pattern
of tensions. This would certainly occur, for example,
if the doubled pull caused one or more of the weaker
strands to snap. This is a "polycentric" situation bestrands
cause it is "many-centered,"-each crossing of
33
tensions.
distributing
for
center
distinct
a
is
Perhaps the concept of the polycentric problem can best be
illustrated by an example and the factual situation involved in
the case of Burford v. Sun Oil Co.34 seems particularly appropriate. In that case the Sun Oil Company appealed an order
of the Texas Railroad Commission granting Burford permission
to drill four well on a small plot of land located in an East
Texas oil field. The Commission was charged with the duty of
conserving the state's oil reserves by the prevention of waste
while, at the same time, allowing the individual land owners to
recover their fair share of the oil pool lying beneath their
property. The oil pool in question was approximately forty
miles long, between five and nine miles wide, and had over
26,000 wells drilled into it. The surface area of the field was
divided into many small tracts. Since the oil in the pool circulated throughout the entire field, one well operator could
"not only draw the oil from under his own surface area" 35 but
also from under the surface area of more distant wells. This
practice was called confiscation. The problem was also compli32. The Forn s And Limits Of Adjudication at 36-45.

33. Id. at 36.
34. 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
35. Id. at 319.
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cated by the need to maintain sufficient gas and water pressure
to force the oil through the wells to the surface. If this pressure were lost, then the oil could only be recovered by pumping
it to the surface at great expense. In an effort to prevent waste,
the Commission adopted, in cooperation with other states, oil
production quotas based upon such factors as "full utilization
of the oil supply, market demand, and protection of the individ3
ual operators, as well as protection of the public interest."1
These quotas were "translated" into a specific amount of oil
that could be produced by each well. Moreover, the Commission
regulated the spacing of the individual wells. Exceptions were
allowed, however, as in the instant case, to prevent confiscation
and insure a well operator that he would recover his fair share.
In the factual situation as just outlined, each well operator
constituted an interacting center of influence. Every time one
well operator was granted an exception, this decision would
ultimately effect other distant well owners through confiscation or loss of pressure and thus precipitate the necessity of
granting more exceptions. These new exceptions would in turn
precipitate the necessity of granting still more exceptions or
perhaps even a change in quota or spacing requirements. It was
estimated that over two-thirds of the wells in question were
exceptions to the general rule.
The Supreme Court perhaps sensed the strong polycentric features presented by the Burford case. Recognizing the strong
public policy of the state in conserving its oil reserves and the
confusion that federal judicial intervention had caused here in
the past, the Court held that, although the district court had
jurisdiction, it should have declined to exercise it as a matter
of policy.
As pointed out by Professor Fuller, practically all of the
problems decided by courts have some polycentric features. The
problem for the court is to recognize when a problem is so
polycentric that it is beyond the institutional limits of adjudication. Often a problem will contain covert polycentric features
that don't appear until after a decision has been made. Often,
in such cases, the court will have accommodated the problem to
traditional judicial forms and what at first appears to be a
decision defining rights and duties is "in fact an inept solution
37
for a polycentric problem."
36. Id. at 321.

37. The Forms And Limts Of Adjudication at 39-40.
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To illustrate this point, Professor Fuller gives the following
example:
Suppose a court in a suit between one litigant and a
railway holds that it is an act of negligence for the
railway not to construct an underpass at a particular
crossing. There may be nothing to distinguish this
crossing for other crossings on the line. As a matter
of statistical probability it may be clear that constructing underpasses along the whole line would cost
more lives (through accidents in blasting, for example)
than would be lost if the only safety measure were the
familiar "Stop, Look and Listen" sign. If so, then
what seems to be a decision simply declaring the rights
and duties of two parties is in fact an inept solution
for a polycentric problem, some elements of which'
cannot be brought before the court in a simple suit by
one injured party against a defendant railway.38
With respect to these covert polycentric features that appear
after a decision is made, Professor Fuller points out that the
judicial process as a whole may be able to absorb them if the
courts take a liberal view of precedent and the doctrine of
39

stare deCisis.

In connection with this last point, one might consider the
historical development of water law in the United States.
Watercourses, surface waters, and ground waters were at first
thought to be separate and distinct hydorlogic systems. Accordingly, separate bodies of law were developed for each system.
Now, however, all three are recognized as constituting one
hydrologic cycle.40 Thus, if too much water is withdrawn from
the wells in a given area, a neighboring stream might dry up.
It remains to be seen whether the courts can accommodate the
old cases to these polycentric features that until recently were
unknown.4 1
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id. at 40.
F. TRELEAsE, mtpra note 13, at 84-85.
With respect to ground water, some courts have already begin the

process of accommodation.
Although aquifers are usually fed by seepage from the surface,
and often discharge waters into springs and streams, ground
water in aquifers is so physically different from water in streams
that historically it was treated differently. The first rules were
of ownership: The land owner was regarded as owning the water
underneath his land and was permitted to take whatever quantity
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It is also interesting to note the overt polycentric features
42
that exist in many problems in the area of pollution control.
Thus, a court that enjoins a municipality from burning garbage
in an effort to curb air pollution may precipitate a problem in
pollution from solid wastes. Also, it has been observed that,
although the gas turbine will decrease air pollution, it will increase noise pollution. 43 Moreover, the new advances in pollution control equipment for automobiles, although they reduce
the levels of certain pollutants emitted by automobile engines,
increase the levels of other emissions that may eventually prove
44
harmful to human life.

Indeed, the environment itself, or more precisely the biosphere 0 in which man lives, is extremely complex. It is composed of a number of different ecosystems4 6 that are totally
dependent on one another.47 Every species that inhabits the
he could capture. A number of state courts then imposed requirements that the owner's use of ground water must be reasonable.
Some have applied a rule of correlative rights similar to riparian
doctrines of reasonable sharing.
F. TRELEASE, supra note 13, at 6.
It is also interesting to note in this connection, that some riparian rights
states, which at first espoused the natural flow theory of riparian rights, subsequently switched over to the more utilitarian reasonable use theory. Id. at
119.
42. See generally Bowen, Our New Awareness of the Great Web, FORTUNE,
Feb., 1970, at 193; TImE, Feb. 2, 1970, at 56.
43. Moreover, although "gas turbines emit less carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons than piston engines per pound of feul . . . , [they] burn more fuel per
mile, especially in city traffic." Alexander, Some Burning Questions About
Combustion, FORTUNE, Feb., 1970, at 168.

44. TrIE, Feb. 2, 1970, at 59.
45. The biosphere, a thin film over the surface of the earth where life exists,
has been described as "a vast web of interacting organisms and processes that
form the rhythmic cycles and food chains in which ecosystems support one
another." Id. at 59.
46. The term ecosystem is used by ecologists to describe a system made up
of certain organisms and their physical environment. The elements of an
ecosystem are:
1) inorganic substances (gases, minerals, compounds); 2) "producer" plants, which convert the substances into food; 3) animal
"consumers", which use the food; and 4) "decomposers" (bacteria and fungi), which turn dead protoplasm into usable substances for the producers.
Id. at 57.
Even the simplest ecosystem, it has been said, "is so complex that the largest
computer cannot fully unravel it" Id. at 62-63. And "[i]n the ecosystem of
man, which includes institutions and artifacts that themselves impinge upon
and alter the environment, the interrelations are unimaginably complex."
Bowen, supra note 42, at 198.
47. The interdependence of all living creatures, it has been said, is the
first law of ecology. Bowen, supra note 42, at 198.
The continued functioning of any organism depends upon the
interlinked functionings of many other organisms. Seemingly
autonomous man ultimately depends upon photosynthesis for his
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earth occupies its own niche in a specific ecosystem and all
species, along with all other elements that go to make up their
physical environment, constitute interacting centers of influence, not only with respect to their own ecosystems but with
respect to other ecosystems as well. It is because of this complexity, that man "'can never do merely one thing' ,,s with
respect to the environment. For "[w]hen we intervene in a complex system so as to produce a certain desired effect, we always
get in addition some other effect or effects, usually not desired." 49
All of these polycentric features suggest perhaps that courts
should pay a more limited role in trying to solve the environmental crisis. Perhaps the legislature, or some specially designed administrative agency, is a more appropriate institution
for dealing with the problems discussed. 0 In any event, courts
food. The seemingly autonomous oak in the forest depends upon
microscopic organisms to break down fallen leaves, releasing
nutrients that can be absorbed by its roots. Interrelations between
organisms are often intricate, and some obscure species provide
vital linkages not at all apparent to the casual observer. The
seeds of the bitterbush, an important food plant for browsing animals in arid sections of Africa, fail to germinate unless several
seeds are buried close together below the surface of the soil; that
happens in nature only through the intervention of a species of
ground squirrel, which buries hoards of seeds and often forgets
them. It is unwise for men ever to assume without very close
study that any species is entirely dispensable.
Id.
48. Id. at 199.
49. Id. Moreover, since causes and effects in ecosystems are widely separated in time and space, these undesired results are invariably unexpected.
After years of spraying persistent pesticides to kill insects, we
find that vie have come close to wiping out a national symbol, the
bold eagle: concentrated through food chains, pesticides accumulate in the tissues of eagles and certain other birds to the point of
impairing reproduction. We drain Florida swamp lands and learn
later on that by reducing the outflow of fresh water into estuaries
we have increased their salinity and thereby damaged valuable
breeding environment for fish and shrimp. The Aswan Dam impounds silt that would otherwise be carried downstream, so the
Nile no longer performs as richly as before its ancient function
of renewing fields along its banks. The fertility of the Nile
Valley is therefore declining. That is only one variety of ecological backlash from this triumph of engineering. With the flow of
the river reduced, salt water is backing into the Nile delta, harming farm lands there. And in time, some authorities predict, the
flow of Nile water to new farm lands through irrigation canals
will bring on a calamitous spread of schistosomiasis, a liver disease produced by parasites that spend part of their life cycle in
the bodies of snails.
Id. For other specific examples of "ecological backlash", see TIME, Feb. 2,
1970, at 57, 62.
50. Although adjudication is ill suited for solving polycentric problems,
Professor Fuller points out that the majority principle is likewise "quite
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should at least try to foresee and consider the ecological effects
of their decisions and be prepared to accommodate the judicial
process to any environmental problems inadvertently precipitated by their decisions.
E. The PoZycentric Features of Resource Allocation
In Professor Fuller's view, generally speaking, problems of
resource allocation are too polycentric to be suitable for adjudication. This point is emphasized by several of his statements in the MoipIAIr OF LAW:
By its nature adjudication must act through openly
declared rule or principle, and the grounds on which
it acts must display some continuity through time.
Without this, joinder of argument becomes impossible
and all the conventional safeguards that surround decision (such as that proscribing private conferences
between the litigant and the arbiter of the dispute)
forfeit their meaning.
To act wisely, the economic manager must take into
account every circumstance relevant to his decision and
must himself assume the initiative in discovering what
circumstances are relevant. His decisions must be subject to reversal or change as conditions alter. The
judge, on the other hand, acts upon those facts that are
in advance deemed relevant under declared principles
of decision. His decision does not simply direct resources and energies; it declares rights, and rights to be
meaningful must in some measure stand firm through
changing circumstances. When, therefore, we attempt
to discharge tasks of economic management through
adjudicative forms there is a serious mis match between
the procedure adopted and the problem to be solved.
[W]e must face the plain truth that adjudication is an
ineffective instrument for economic management and
incapable of solving polycentric problems." The Forms And Limits Of Adjudication at 41. Professor Fuller indicates, however, that
polycentric problems can often be solved, at least after a measure,
by parliamentary methods which include an element of contract
in the form of the political "deal." The parties in interest-or,
more realistically, the parties most obviously concerned-are
called together at a legislative hearing or in a conference with
legislative leaders and "an accommodation of interests" is worked
out.
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for governmental participation in the allocation of
economic resources.51
In dealing with the problems of environmental quality, a
court may become involved in the process of allocating resources without realizing it. For example, waste disposal and
industrial cooling are two recognized uses to which the waters
of a particular stream may be put. Either use may result in
pollution of the stream. Thus, if a court decides that a defendant's use of the water for waste disposal is not unreasonable, it has in effect allocated a part of the stream to that use.
If the defendant's activity results in pollution of the stream,
then the end result of the court's decision may be the dedication
of the entire stream to industrial and municipal waste dis52
posal.
In the field of water law, however, courts have historically
engaged in the business of resource allocation.5 3 Although the
adjudication of water rights is at times difficult and subject to
criticism, 54 courts generally recognize that, where jurisdiction
51. L. FULLER, supra note 14, at 17172, 176. Many of the limitations of
adjudication suggested by Professor Fuller are overlapping. Thus moralityof-aspiration-type decisions, which are, generally speaking, entrusted to legislatures, bear a close affinity to resource-allocation decisions. Id. at 15-19.
Legislatures, after all, are responsible for selecting the basic directives of
society with a view toward resources that are scarce in their ability to
achieve all the directives under consideration. In other words, legislatures are
principally responsible for deciding how society should allocate its scarce
resources. And problems of this type tend to center around the top of the
moral scale and they have strong polycentric features. Accordingly, courts
are uncomfortable with them.
52. Another example to illustrate the above proposition would be the
environmental zoning cases where a court is asked to enjoin the development
of a particular region in the name of conservation. Here the court's decision
will necessarily have the effect of allocating the land in question to a particular use. See discussion in text accompaning notes 30-31 supra and note 71
infra. In such cases the problems inherent in the task of resource allocation
are further complicated by the existance of the other polycentric features that
are associated with environmental problems.
53. See F. TRELEASE, supra note 13, at 160-64, 167-71.
54. Id. at 162; Johnson, Adjudication of Water Rights, 42 TEXAS L. REv.
121 (1963). The criticism usually directed at the adjudication of water rights
concerns itself with the inadequacy of the available procedures.
A charge often leveled at the traditional judicial procedures is
the assertion that courts lack the necessary expertness to deal
adequately with the hydrological and other technical non-legal
problems involved in water rights adjudications. Kinney's reference to "the ludicrous spectacle of learned judges solemnly
decreeing the right to from two to ten times the amount of
water flowing in a stream" is frequently quoted. One may well
wonder why courts which are able to handle cases involving
technical issues of medical science in personal injury litigation,
geology and engineering in oil and gase [sic] cases, surveying in
boundary suits, industrial processes in patent infringment cases,
corporate finance in stockholders' suits, economics in antitrust
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over the parties and subject matter is proper, equity not only
has the power to apportion water among the litigants, but also
the power to prescribe the method of apportionment and
measurement. 55 Moreover, the acquisition and use of water has
traditionally been viewed as a right, especially in the arid
western states where water is a scarce commodity. 56 Likewise,
pollution has traditionally been viewed as a wrong, and, as
previously mentioned, courts are principally concerned with
the formal declaration of rights and wrongs. Furthermore, the
recognition of individual rights is simply one method or resource allocation. As Dean Frank J. Trelease of the University
of Wyoming Law School points out:
American institutions are for the most part based upon
the theory that in our present economy, where individuals with a wide range of free choice make their
litigation, and so forth, are unable to cope with the technical
aspects of water rights controversies. Perhaps one explanation is
that courts have received insufficient assistance from counsel in
water rights cases, whose clients are unable or unwilling to bear
the financial burden of producing the voluminous mass of data
required for proper disposition of such cases.
Johnson, supra, at 129 (footnotes omitted). Perhaps the real reason why
courts have so much trouble with water rights cases is, as Professor Fuller
suggests, that adjudication is institutionally ill suited for the allocation of
resources. L. FULLER, supra note 14, at 171-72, 176. See also Fuller, Irrigation
and Tyranny, 17 STAN. L. Rav. 1021 (1965).
55. Hidalgo County Water Improvement Dist. No. 2 v. Cameron County
Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 5, 253 S.W.2d 294, 296-97 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1952). The use of the equitable bill of peace as an instrument for
adjudicating the rights to water and the difficulties involved are discussed
in F. TPaELASE, supra note 13, at 161-62. For a discussion of water measurement, see id. at 7-8.
56. Generally speaking, water rights in the eastern states are tied to a
particular class of land-riparian land. The water itself is allocated equally
among riparian land owners according to the principle of reasonable use. In
the western states, however, water rights are normally allocated to those
persons who are actually using the water regardless of whether or not they
are riparian to the stream. These people are called appropriators and the
water itself is allocated unequally among competing appropriators according
to the principle of first in time, first in right. F. TRELEASE, supra note 13, at

1-7.
The right to use water is more properly considered a true right under the
western system of prior appropriation than under the eastern system of
riparian rights. Since an appropriator's right to use the water is more readily
translated into a specific amount of water, it is more definite and certain and
other inferior appropriators are under a duty to respect it A riparian user's
right, however, might be more properly described as a privilege. That is to
say, that he has a privilege that is subject to the exercise of a like privilege
in other riparians. See id. at 7.
Ten states, California, Kansas, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, and Washington, have developed
or adopted a dual system of water law that combines elements of both the
prior appropriates and riparian systems. Other states, including Florida,
Hawaii, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, follow a statutorily
modified riparian rights system. Id. at 5-6.
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own decisions within limits set by governments, each
will attempt to achieve the largest possible benefit for
himself, and the total result of all of this individual
action will tend to produce maximum welfare for the
state or nation.
The institution most used in western civilization for
allocating elements of man's environment to individuals is private property. The state creates in individual
or groups "rights, powers or privileges" to deal in certain ways with certain aspects of the natural resources
7
upon which welfare depends.
Dean Trelease also points out that the goal of natural resource law, and of law generally, is to order human activity in
such a way as to minimize waste and attain "the largest possible 'net social returns' from the use of a resource."58 This
principle of maximum utilization is also the goal of resource
allocation from an economic stand point. As Professor Fuller
points out, "[economic calculation] knows but one general principle, that of obtaining a maximum return from limited resources."' 5 9 Professor Fuller, however, feels that this goal cannot be attained through the forms of adjudication.
Nevertheless, the principle of maximum utilization has had
a significant impact on the development of natural resource
law. For example, it is often said that no one has a right to
pollute the environment. Yet courts in the past have in effect
given industrial defendants a license to do just that by refusing
to enjoin pollution in a proper case. The equitable doctrine of
balance of convenience has been used in a number of cases to
protect industrial defendants from the rigors of nuisance law
at the expense of the environment.00 In these cases the courts
presumably calculate that the particular river, stream, or other
resource involved can yield "the largest possible 'net social returns'"61 by serving industry as a cheap method of waste
disposal. 62
57. Id. at 6.
58. Id.
59. L. FuLLR, supra note 14, at 171. See also id. at 15-19.
60. See, e.g., Pennsylvannia Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. St. 126, 6 A.
453 (1886). As a result of the Sanderson decision, in which the court even
refused to allow the plaintiff to recover damages, many Pennsylvania streams
were destroyed by coal mining operations. F. TDEEASE, supra note 13, at
244-45.
61. F. TRELEASE, supra note 14, at 6.
62. See, e.g., Hampton v. North Carolina Pulp Co., 49 F. Supp. 625
(E.D.N.C. 1943); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. St. 126, 6 A.
453 (1886).
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The calculus of net social returns has undergone a change in
recent times, however. Man is now better able to compute the
social cost of pollution, 3 and courts, when called upon to
balance the convenience of the parties, should also balance the
economic and social interests of the community against the
possible injury to the environment. The community's sense of
priorities in this areas seems to be shifting, however. 64 More
and more emphasis is being placed on the quality of life as
opposed to economic and industrial development at any cost.
Thus, a court that is called upon to trade off environmental
quality in favor of development will generally lack the confidence typical of some of the earlier decisions 65 where substantial environmental interests were sacrificed in favor of
other social and economic interests.
F. The ConstitutionaZ Aspects of the Institutionaz Limits of
Adjudication
In the field of constitutional law, there exist certain legal
doctrines that attempt in some measure to define the institutional limits of adjudication. One such doctrine is the doctrine
of political questions. Another is the doctrine of standing. Both
66
are different aspects of the case-controversy requirement,
Some of the problems involved in recognizing a right to pollute were
discussed earlier in note 13 supra. Dean Trelease outlines the problem as
follows:
Should property rights to pollute be allocated to individuals and
firms? . . . The industry whose processes of grinding, washing

and chemical treatment of materials produce a noxious waste
product must get rid of it, and dumping it into a stream is often
the cheapest way of disposing of it. The industry's costs are
minimized and its profits are maximized. The municipality that
dumps raw sewage into a stream realizes the benefits of getting
rid of it at a cost of practically nothing. An irrigator who withdraws water from a stream makes it unavailable to others. He
uses it to produce wealth, and his use is called reasonable and
beneficial. The polluter makes water unavailable for use by
others and produces wealth by the negative process of cutting cost.
F. TRELEASE, supra note 13, at 244.
63. See Rose, The Economics of Environmental Quality, FoRTuNE, Feb.,
1970, at 120.
64. Jackson, Foreward: Environmental Quality, The Courts, And The
Congress, 68 MicH. L. Rxv. 1073, 1074-75 (1970); Comment, Equity and the
Eco-System: Can Injunctions Clean the Air?, 68 MICH. L REv. 1254, 1266
(1970).
65. Cases cited note 62 supra.
66. See generally C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FDERAL CouRTs
§§ 12-15 (2d ed. 1970). The doctrine of standing focuses on the parties to the
suit, whereas the political question doctrine focuses on the subject matter of
the litigation.
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which is the primary limitation on the judicial power in a
67
constitutional sense.

The political question doctrine, it has been said, is "essentially
a function of the separation of powers."(" That is to say, in
the United States the powers of each of the three coordinate
branches of government, both at the federal and state levels,
are spelled out in a written constitution. 9 Each branch has its
own separate and distinct sphere of activity and each is precluded from performing tasks that are peculiar to another
branch. In this sense the political question doctrine attempts to
define the outer limits of the judicial power.
Generally speaking, political questions fall into two major
categories: (1) questions that are committed by the constitution
to another coordinate branch70 or (2) questions that are, in the
nature of things, peculiarly appropriate for decision by another
branch. This second category would seemingly include questions that have strong polycentric features or questions that are
essentially legislative in nature in the sense that they call for
a morality-of-aspiration-type decision. In other words, questions that are so far beyond the institutional limits of adjudication that they are beyond the constitutional limits of the
judicial power.
If a court is presented with a problem that has strong ploy67. "Article III of the United States Constitution limits the power of the
judiciary to deciding 'case or controversies', and many state courts require
similar grounds of justiciability." Comment, Equity and the Rco-System:
Can Injunctions Clean the Air?, 68 Micxr. L. REv. 1254, 1264 (1970) (footnotes omitted).
68. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). This case contains the classic
statement of the doctrine:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack
of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to
a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Id.
69. At the federal level, the separation of powers is implicit in the scheme
of government set up by the United States Constitution. Some state constitutions, however, expressly provide for the separation of powers. See, e.g., S.C.
CoNsT. art. 1, § 14.
70. The first category describes the so called "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment." Powell v. McCormick, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
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centric features or a problem that is otherwise beyond the
institutional limits of adjudication, it should consider the constitutional implications of an exercise of jurisdiction. For example, in the environmental zoning cases, the courts are asked
to decide whether a particular region should be used for development or conservation. It was pointed out earlier that in
such cases the courts will probably not be able to look to a
strong sense of community either way. Thus, the fact situation
does not readily suggest a rule of decision to be applied. Also
the problem presented would involve the courts in the task of
allocating resources-a task not suited to the forms of adjudication. Moreover, the polycentric features of many environmental
71
problems should give courts pause.
The other constitutional doctrine mentioned above, the doctrine of standing 72 is perhaps related in some way to the moral71. Also the problem may be complicated by other political factors. For
example, the particular region may have been singled out for development
by an industrial firm in coordination with a state agency in charge of the
state's industrial development. Thus, if the court permanently enjoins construction, it is frustrating a policy of the state legislature as expressed through
one of its agencies.
72. See generally C. WRIGHT, snpra note 66, § 13. The requirement of
standing has been the subject of much criticism in recent years but there are
perhaps some valid policy reasons for retaining the requirement. Recently
Michigan adopted a law that "lets ordinary citizens sue polluters without
having to show evidence of direct personal injury." Holsendolph, States
Join the Pollution Battle, FORTUNE, Oct., 1970, at 116. In light of the present
crisis in the courts of the United States, the wisdom of such a statute seems
questionable. See Main, Only Radical Reform Can Save the Courts, FORTUNE,
Aug., 1970, at 111.
The courts cannot continue to deal with an exponentially increasing amount of regular business and have society's new problems
dumped on them as well. Society will have to choose priorities,
and decide anew which kinds of problems are worth the time of
the courts and can be solved only by the courts. For the problems that don't pass that test, society should seek other solutions.
Id. at 113.
Moreover, it may be that courts are institutionally ill suited to deal with
polution problems where the plaintiff has suffered no direct personal injury.
Indeed, some people question the wisdom of trying to solve environmental
problems with the traditional law suit.
Better handling of the environment is going to require lots of
legal innovation to shape the integrative forums and regulatory
bodies where our new-found environmental concerns may be given
concrete reality. These new legal devices will extend all the way
from treaties forbidding oil pollution on the high seas down to the
minute concerns of local government. But the present wave of
conservationist interest among lawyers and law students does not
seem to be headed along that constructive path. Rather, it appears
intent on multiplying two-party conflicts between "polluters" and
victims.
When we read of some environmental atrocity-a sonic boom,
a baby bitten in a rat-infested slum, a disease caused by polluted
air--our sympathies go out to the victims, just as our sympathies
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ity of duty. It was pointed out earlier that the decisions that
courts make tend to cluster around the morality of duty and
that courts are principally concerned with assessing penalties
"for failing to respect the basic requirements of social living."13
The requirement of standing in a sense insures that courts will
stay within their proper sphere of activity. For where the defendant's conduct violates "the basic requirements of social living," 4 the plaintiff will likely be able to point, to some specific
injury that will give him standing. And where pollution, for
instance, constitutes a threat to the continued existence of organized society, there will likely be some member of the community who has standing to complain. But where the pollution
complained of does not constitute a threat to the continued
existence of organized society or a failure "to respect the basic
requirements of social living,"7 there will likely be no member
of the community who has standing to complain.
0. The Role of the Court in Protecting the Enviranment
What is the proper role of the court, as an institution, in
protecting the environment? Perhaps the most helpful way to
think about the role of the court here is in terms of the morality
of duty. It was pointed out earlier that the decisions that courts
make on a case by case basis tend to cluster around the bottom
of the moral scale-the morality of duty. Courts are concerned
with questions of right and wrong and duty and obligation;
they are also concerned with assessing penalties "for failing to
respect the basic requirements of social living 7, A legislature,
on the other hand, is concerned with deciding how the community should allocate its scarce resources. It is a more appropriate
institution for setting or changing the basic directives of society.
go out to those hurt in automobile accidents. This example should
give us pause. The damage suit as a legal remedy in automobile
accident has clogged the courts and imposed on the public a $7billion annual bill for liability insurance premiums. This huge

cost contributes almost nothing to highway safety. For a fraction
of the dollars and the legal brains drained off by damage suits
we could have produced better highway codes and better regulations for car safety-and also provided compensation for the
victims of a diminished number of accidents. If environmental law
follows the dismal pattern of automobile tort cases, every business
and perhaps every individual will be carrying insurance against
pollution-damage suits. An army of pollution chasers, hot for
those contingent fees, will join the present army of ambulance
chasers. None of that is going to do the environment any good.

Ways, How to Think About the Environment,
73. L. FULLER, supra note 14, at

FORTUNE,

Feb., 1970, at 165.

74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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With respect to the environmental crisis, then, the court's role
as an institution is to enforce "the basic requirements of social

living"7 7 by enjoining forms and levels of pollution that constitute a threat to the continued existence of society. Since this
category of pollution is increasing, it seems likely that the
court's role here is growing and will continue to grow. For as
the aggregate levels of polltion increase and as man's knowledge
about the environment increases, forms and levels of pollution
previously thought to be innocuous now appear to constitute
definite threats to man's continued existence.
Courts should be careful, however, not to disturb the basic
directives of society in the guise of enjoining environmental
wrongs. Certain minimum rules must be observed if social living is to continue. For example, a defendant cannot be permitted to dump his garbage in the plaintiff's well. But we
must have some factories and a decision to have more factories
and less parks or less factories and more parks is a legislative
question. It involves selecting from competing ends (e.g., parks
and factories) with a view toward resources (e.g., undeveloped
land, water, etc.) that are limited in their capacity to achieve all
the ends under consideration.
The court's role as an enforcer of "the basic requirements of
social living"7 8 is perhaps too limited to suit most conservationists. The polycentric features of many environmental problems,
however, tend to support the suggestion that the courts should
play a more limited role here and let more appropriate institutions attempt to solve the environmental crisis. 7 9 Moreover,
there are certain things a court can do to insure that environmental problems are properly resolved without becoming involved in the merits. 0
MANTow

M. GRmR

77. Id.
78. Id.

79. Note 50, supra.
80. See Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine In Natural Resource Law: Effec-

tive Judicial Intervention, 68 MIcH. L. RFV. 471, 557-566 (1970).

Professor

Sax points out that courts may
effectively overrule a questionable policy decision by requiring
that the appropriate agency provide further justification; alternatively, the courts may, in effect, remand the matter for additional
consideration in the political sphere, thus manipulating the political burdens either to aid underrepresented and politically weak
interests or to give final authroity over the matter to a more
adequately representative body.
Id. at 558.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1971

21

